Procrastination with variable present bias by Gravin, Nick et al.
Procrastination with Variable Present Bias
Nick Gravin, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; ngravin@mit.edu
Nicole Immorlica, Microsoft Research; nicimm@gmail.com
Brendan Lucier, Microsoft Research; brlucier@microsoft.com
Emmanouil Pountourakis, Northwestern University; manolis@u.northwestern.edu
Individuals working towards a goal often exhibit time inconsistent behavior, making plans and then failing
to follow through. One well-known model of such behavioral anomalies is present-bias discounting: individ-
uals over-weight present costs by a bias factor. This model explains many time-inconsistent behaviors, but
can make stark predictions in many settings: individuals either follow the most efficient plan for reaching
their goal or procrastinate indefinitely.
We propose a modification in which the present-bias parameter can vary over time, drawn independently
each step from a fixed distribution. Following Kleinberg and Oren (2014), we use a weighted task graph to
model task planning, and measure the cost of procrastination as the relative expected cost of the chosen
path versus the optimal path. We use a novel connection to optimal pricing theory to describe the structure
of the worst-case task graph for any present-bias distribution. We then leverage this structure to derive
conditions on the bias distribution under which the worst-case ratio is exponential (in time) or constant.
We also examine conditions on the task graph that lead to improved procrastination ratios: graphs with a
uniformly bounded distance to the goal, and graphs in which the distance to the goal monotonically decreases
on any path.
1. INTRODUCTION
Intertemporal tradeoffs – in which an individual incurs short-term costs to achieve
long-term goals – have significant implications for health, wealth, and educational
outcomes. A student may complete a homework assignment due next week instead
of partying with friends. A marathoner may decide to go for a morning training run
instead of sleeping in. A skier with a season pass may choose to buy skies instead of
renting them each weekend, if it is less costly to do so. Long-term goals like these often
involve many sacrifices over time, requiring the individual to form a consistent plan
of future action. Anecdotally, however, individuals often have trouble sticking to such
plans. This is supported empirically by the observation that experimental subjects dis-
count future payoffs at a non-constant rate. When asked how much money a subject
would require in a month/year/decade to offset $15 today, the median response was
$20/$50/$100 [Thaler 1981]. Since these responses are not consistent with any con-
stant discount factor, a subject with these preferences might plan today to invest $20
next month to gain $100 in a decade, but then fail to follow through next month.
These observations have led to an extensive line of work in behavioral economics,
proposing behavior models that allow divergence between plan and action. The eco-
nomic theory of hyperbolic discounting is one such model developed to explain these
time inconsistencies. A hyperbolic discount function assigns weights to future costs.
At each point in time, an individual forms a plan which minimizes total costs cal-
culated according to the hyperbolic discounting function. A special case of hyperbolic
discounting, developed by Akerloff [Akerlof 1991], is present-bias discounting. In its
simplest form, present-bias discounting predicts that individuals will inflate any costs
incurred at the present moment by a model parameter b > 1, and leave all future costs
unweighted.
As an example illustrating how present bias can lead to procrastination, consider a
student who must complete a homework assignment.1 The assignment, which is based
on today’s lecture, is due next week. The homework takes one night to complete, and
1This example is a minor reformulation of an example due to Akerloff.
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there is a cost (in mental effort and missed social opportunities) to complete the assign-
ment immediately after the lecture. Each day that goes by, the student’s recollection of
lecture becomes dimmer, and the cost for completing the assignment increases. In this
scenario, it is clearly optimal, in terms of minimizing induced costs, to complete the
homework assignment the day of the lecture. However, if the student inflates present-
day costs, he may perceive that it is less costly to complete the assignment tomorrow
than today. Facing a similar decision tomorrow, he again perceives that procrastinat-
ing is less costly than completing the assignment immediately. This procrastination
behavior persists, and the student doesn’t complete the assignment until the last day,
spending substantially more than the optimal plan.
The preceding example contains a very stark prediction: the student will either pro-
crastinate indefinitely, if present-biased, or not at all. As noted in prior work of Klein-
berg and Oren [Kleinberg and Oren 2014], this dichotomy persists even in the face
of exponentially increasing costs, causing a present-biased student to spend exponen-
tially more than necessary. In reality, one should expect a more nuanced behavior – any
given individual might procrastinate for some amount of time, but eventually even the
most lackadaisical students will exert effort to avoid future penalties. Such variation
in procrastination behavior can arise from variability in the present-bias parameter.
In this work, we assume that the agent has a present-bias parameter bi drawn on
each day i independently at random from a distribution F supported on [0, 1). For
the preceding example, if the student’s present bias parameter has a constant prob-
ability of taking value 1, then the student will delay for only a constant number of
days, in expectation, before completing their assignment. We ask: how does variabil-
ity in present-bias change procrastination behavior? Are there structured choices, e.g.,
homework late policies, that guide individuals away from costly procrastination?
To study these questions, we adopt a graph-theoretic framework for task comple-
tion proposed by Kleinberg and Oren [Kleinberg and Oren 2014]. In this framework,
an agent with a goal n days in the future traverses through a weighted task graph
G starting from node s and ending at node t. On each day i, if the agent’s current
present bias is bi and current state is v, then the weight of the first edge along a v − t
path is multiplied by an extra factor of bi, while all the remaining edges are evalu-
ated according to their true weights. The agent chooses a minimal-weight path, under
this distortion, and follows the first edge of that path. For a given task graph G and
present-bias distribution F , the procrastination ratio is the ratio between the expected
total weight of the traversed path to the weight of the initial shortest path. We are in-
terested in bounding the procrastination ratio as a function of n, the number of days
until the deadline for the task.2
Under this model, we can state our question more concretely: are there natural con-
ditions that guarantee a low procrastination ratio? Recall that in the student example,
if there is a constant probability of bias bi = 1, the student will complete the assign-
ment in a constant number of days in expectation. As it turns out, this is not sufficient
to guarantee a sub-exponential procrastination ratio (see Section 2 for more details).
Our first result shows that, for any distribution, the graph with maximal procrastina-
tion ratio has exactly this form: on any day, the agent may either complete the task for
a growing cost or procrastinate for free. The proof of this result involves a connection to
optimal pricing theory: the problem of constructing a worst-case graph can be reduced
to the problem of designing a revenue-optimal auction. For example, the fact that on
any day there is only one costly edge is a consequence of the fact that the optimal
2Kleinberg and Oren [Kleinberg and Oren 2014] bounded the procrastination ratio with respect to the total
number of nodes in the graph, rather than the path length n, but these are essentially equivalent; see
Section 2.
pricing menu for a single-parameter agent has a single deterministic option [Myerson
1981].
We can leverage this description of the worst-case task graph to develop bounds on
the procrastination ratio as a function of the present-bias distribution. In optimal pric-
ing theory, a special subclass of Pareto distributions, often referred to as equal-revenue
distributions, are useful for worst-case examples. For a given present-bias distribution,
we calculate the “smallest” equal-revenue distribution that stochastically dominates it.
As worst-case procrastination ratios grow with stochastic dominance, this gives us an
upper bound on the worst-case procrastination ratio of any given present-bias distri-
bution. One can similarly derive lower bounds for any distribution that is not dom-
inated by a particular equal-revenue distribution. One implication of our analysis is
that present-bias distributions can be roughly divided into two categories: those with
light tails tend to have low (linear or even constant) worst-case procrastination ratios,
whereas heavy-tailed distributions tend to have worst-case procrastination ratios that
are exponential in n.
These worst-case examples lead us to ask whether there are natural conditions on
the task graph, as well as the present-bias distribution, that lead to smaller procras-
tination ratios. Intuitively, the key feature of the worst-case graph discussed above is
that sub-optimal planning can cause an agent to not only incur extra costs today, but
also reach a state from which the agent is strictly worse off; i.e., the cost of complet-
ing the task can be higher than it was initially. We say that a graph has the bounded
distance property if the weight of the shortest path from any node v to the target t is
at most the weight of the shortest path from the initial node s to t. This condition cap-
tures scenarios, like training for a marathon, in which each day of training improves
preparedness whereas procrastination diminishes it, but not below the initial base
level. We show for any distribution F , the procrastination ratio of a bounded shortest-
path graph is at most linear in n, and that this bound is tight even for distributions
that have a constant probability of bi = 1.
We next consider a stronger condition under which the procrastination ratio is
constant. We say a graph has the monotone distance property if, for any s − t path
(s = v0, v1, . . . , vk−1, t = vk), the shortest path from vi to t is decreasing in i. Roughly
speaking, this condition captures scenarios in which progress made by an individual is
not lost: regardless of an agent’s action in the present round, the total cost required to
complete the task has not increased. For example, consider a skier deciding whether
to rent or buy skies each weekend of the skiing season: as the cost of buying skies
remains constant over time, the total cost required to ski the remainder of the sea-
son does not grow. We show that if the distribution over present-bias parameters has
sufficient mass at biases close to 1,3 then the procrastination ratio of graphs with the
monotone distance property is bounded by a constant. Moreover, the condition on the
present-bias distribution is necessary for this result: if the agent has constant bias
b > 1, there exist monotone-shortest-path graphs for which the procrastination ratio is
Ω(n).4
1.1. Related work
Behavioral Economics. Behavioral economics and game theory study models that
can explain anomalies in human behavior which are consistently observed in exper-
3See Section 5.2 for a formal statement of the condition on the distribution. For example, the condition is
satisfied whenever there is a positive probability that the bias is equal to 1.
4Akerloff ’s original example of mailing a package is such an example: it satisfies the monotone distance
property and has linear procrastination ratio. See Kleinberg and Oren [Kleinberg and Oren 2014] for a
graph-theoretic formulation of that example.
imental data, see for example [Colin 2003]. Our work adopts the model of [Akerlof
1991] which aims to explain individual’s procrastination that violates classical as-
sumption of utility-maximizing individual’s behavior. Closely related to procrastina-
tion are issues of abandonment of long-time projects [O’Donoghue and Rabin 2008] and
benefit of imposing a deadline in the context of task completion [Ariely and Werten-
broch 2002]. Other examples include models addressing attentiveness issues, e.g.,
where reduction of choice among the options available to an agent [O’Donoghue and
Rabin 1999], or delayed notification messages [Ely 2015] may improve agent’s perfor-
mance.
Some behavioral models study various levels of agents’ rationality. For example
Kaur, Kremer, and Mullainathan [Kaur et al. 2010] study sophisticated customers
who are aware of their possible future procrastination, and Wright and Leyton-
Brown [Wright and Leyton-Brown 2010, 2012, 2014] model agents’ behavior via quan-
tal cognitive hierarchies in single-round simultaneous-move games where agents are
empirically observed not to follow Nash equilibrium strategies.
Hyperbolic Discounting. A significant amount of work in economics literature has
been devoted to the study of quasi-hyperbolic discounting, see [Frederick et al. 2002]
for a survey. This form of discounting function generalizes Akerlof ’s model by model-
ing agent’s behavior with two parameters: present-bias factor b and discounting fac-
tor δ ≤ 1. In this model the agent at every step scales up the immediate cost by b,
and discounts every cost t steps away into the future by a factor of δt. This form of
discounting has been used in many areas including addiction [Beshears et al. 2015],
self-control [Laibson 2015], and health and pre-retirement savings [Choi et al. 2004].
Graphical Model. Our work uses the model of procrastination proposed by Ak-
erlof [Akerlof 1991] and adapts the graphical framework of Kleinberg and Oren [Klein-
berg and Oren 2014]. The latter work studies graphical properties of the network
which may cause high procrastination rates, and identifies a graph-minor condition
on the task graph that implies a bound on the procrastination ratio. The follow-up
work of Tang et al. [Tang et al. 2014] provides improved bounds on the procrastination
ratio, again as a function of this graph-minor condition.
Techniques. We model an individual as an agent performing graph traversal un-
der uncertainty. Related models also appear in the literature on route planning under
uncertainty [Nikolova and Karger 2008], or risk-aversion in routing and congestion
games[Nikolova and Moses 2011, 2014, 2015] but under different objectives.
Some of our technical results exploit a connection between agent behavior under hy-
perbolic discounting and auction theory. In particular, we use tools characterizing the
space of optimal single-item auctions under a distribution of agent values, as explored
by Myerson [Myerson 1981].
2. MODEL
We consider a setting in which an agent must complete a task over a period of n days.
We track the progress of the agent towards task completion using states of interme-
diate progress, which are nodes of a task graph G = (∪n+1i=1 Vi, E) with edge weights
w : E → R+. The set of nodes Vi are the possible states of the agent on day i. We
assume without loss of generality that V1 = {s}, the start node, and Vn+1 = {t}, the
end node. All edges occur between nodes on consecutive days, i.e., vivj ∈ E if and only
if vi ∈ Vi and vj ∈ Vi+1. The weights represent the cost of transitioning between states:
i.e., an agent in state vi wishing to transition to a state vi+1 incurs a cost of w(vivi+1).
The agent starts from state s = v1 on day 1, follows a path (v1v2, . . . , vnvn+1) in G, and
ends in state t = vn+1 on day n+ 1, for a total cost of
∑n
i=1 w(vivi+1).
5 For convenience
we will refer to the shortest path between two nodes vi and vj in G as the distance,
denoted d(vi, vj). Thus the minimum cost way to complete the task is d(s, t).
We are interested in the inefficiency of the traversed path due to the variable
present-bias of the agent. As such, for each day i we introduce a present-bias factor
bi drawn i.i.d. from a given distribution F supported on [1,∞). When calculating costs
on day i, the agent inflates costs incurred on that day by bi while leaving remaining
costs unweighted. Thus an agent currently in state vi on day i will choose a transition
vivi+1 minimizing
bi · w(vivi+1) + d(vi+1, t).
Note that on the following day i+1 the agent again chooses an edge using a (potentially
different) present-bias factor bi+1, and may therefore choose a state vi+2 different from
his planned path on day i.
We consider the ratio of the weight of the chosen path v1v2, . . . , vnvn+1 with the
weight of the shortest s− t path: ∑n
i=1 w(vivi+1)
d(s, t)
.
The procrastination ratio is then the expectation (over the choice of the present bias
factors) of this ratio.
In summary, an instance of our problem consists of a weighted task graph G and
present-bias distribution F . We would like to understand the structure of worst-case
instances, i.e., the distributions and tasks graphs that achieve the maximum procras-
tination ratio. We would also like to describe natural classes of instances with small
procrastination ratios. To this end, it is useful to introduce the following restrictions
on task graphs.
Definition 2.1 (Bounded Distance). A weighted task graph G satisfies bounded dis-
tance, if ∀i, and ∀vi ∈ Vi, d(vi, t) ≤ d(s, t).
Intuitively, the bounded distance property captures scenarios in which one’s current
state, in terms of the optimal cost to reach the goal, is never worse than the initial
state. For example, this includes scenarios in which “starting over” is always a free and
feasible option: i.e., from each vertex there is a 0-cost edge to a vertex whose distance
from t is at most d(vi, t).
Definition 2.2 (Monotone Distance). A weighted graph G satisfies monotone dis-
tance if ∀i and ∀vivi+1 ∈ E with vi ∈ Vi, vi+1 ∈ Vi+1, d(vi, t) ≥ d(vi+1, t).
This captures scenarios where the agent always makes progress towards the end state,
i.e., no transition causes the agent to lose any of his prior accomplishments. We note
that the latter restriction implies the former one, in the sense that any graph with
monotone distances also has bounded distances.
Remark. Kleinberg and Oren [Kleinberg and Oren 2014] studied task planning in
generic weighted directed acyclic graphs G′ = (V ′, E′) with a designated start node s
and end node t, and presented the procrastination ratio as a function of the number of
nodes inG′, sayN . To transform their setup to ours, simply add a self-loop to t of weight
0, create N sets Vi where Vi contains copies of all nodes v ∈ V ′ that can be reached from
s via a path of exactly i − 1 edges in G′, and create weighted edges between nodes of
5Note we do not assume the agent completes the task; task abandonment can be represented by having a
costly edge from a state vn ∈ Vn to t.
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Fig. 1. Task completion graphs for the examples in Section 3.
Vi and Vi+1 if such edges exist in E′. Note that under this transformation, the number
of steps n is at most N , and the total number of vertices in the constructed graph is
O(N2).
3. EXAMPLES
To illustrate the model and definitions introduced in Section 2, we work through in-
stantiations of the scenarios discussed in the introduction. Throughout the course of
this discussion, we will assume an agent with a present-bias factor bi drawn from dis-
tribution F which takes value 1 with probability 1/3 and value 3 with probability 2/3.
Note that this distribution is “close to rational” in the sense that the agent has a con-
stant probability of bi = 1. In each example, we will normalize the shortest s − t path
to be 1 and so the procrastination ratio is just the expected cost induced by the agent.
3.1. Students Preparing Homework
Our first scenario in the introduction concerned a student assigned homework, where
the student’s memory of the requisite material diminishes as time passes. Suppose
the homework is assigned on day 1 and due on day n + 1. We construct a task graph
G = (∪n+1i=1 Vi, E) with V1 = {s1} and Vn+1 = {tn+1}. On each day i ∈ 2, . . . , n, there
are two possible states si and ti corresponding to whether the student completed the
assignment (si) or not (ti). The edges are: E = {sisi+1|i = 1 . . . n − 1} ∪ {titi+1|i =
2 . . . n} ∪ {siti+1|i = 1 . . . n}. The cost of transitioning from si to si+1 or from ti to ti+1
is zero. The cost of transitioning from si to ti+1 is wsiti+1 = 2i−1. This models the idea
that the mental effort to complete the assignment grows by a factor of 2 each day as
the student’s recollection of the material from lecture becomes dimmer. See Figure 1(b)
for a representation of this task graph.
Note that this task graph does not have the bounded distance property. Accordingly,
the procrastination ratio can be exponential, and indeed is exponential for the distri-
bution F . To see this, note on day i, the perceived cost of completing the assignment
that day is bi · 2i−1 while the cost of waiting to complete the homework on the next
day is 2i. Thus, if the instantiation of bi is greater than 2, then the student will decide
to complete the assignment on the following day. For the present-bias distribution F
described above, this event occurs with probability 2/3, and so the total expected cost
incurred by the student is
∑n+1
i=1 (2/3)
i2i−1, which is exponential in n.
3.2. Runners Training for a Marathon
Our second scenario in the introduction concerned a runner training for a marathon.
The runner’s fitness diminishes each day she sleeps in instead of going for a training
run. Suppose the runner starts training on day 1 and the marathon is scheduled for
day n + 1. The task graph G = (∪n+1i=1 Vi, E) has V1 = {s} and Vn+1 = {t}. The runner
has a fitness level in {0, . . . ,m} where 0 is the base-level fitness and m is peak fitness.
If the runner is at fitness level j < m on day i < n, then the runner can pay 1m to train
and increase fitness to level j + 1 on day i+ 1. Alternatively, if the runner is at fitness
level j > 0 on day i < n, then the runner can sleep in, paying 0, and drop to fitness
level j − 1 on day i + 1. We assume the runner can maintain fitness level m for 0 cost
and level 0 at a small cost  < 23m .
6 On day n, if the runner is at fitness level j, then
she pays 1 − jm to run the marathon. See Figure 1(a) for a representation of this task
graph.
Note that this task graph has the bounded distance property. As we show in Sec-
tion 5.1, such graphs have at most a linear procrastination ratio, for any distribution
over present-bias parameters. For bi ∼ F , this task graph nearly achieves this bound.
To see this, note that on day i < n, if the runner is at fitness level 0 < j < m, then
she perceives training as costing her bi · 1m + (1− j+1m ) and not training as costing her
1 − j−1m . Therefore, she trains when bi = 1 and sleeps in when bi = 3 (ignoring bound-
ary conditions at fitness level 0). This is a bounded random walk on the integers from
{0, . . . ,m} with an absorbing state at m. The transition probabilities are biased toward
lower fitness levels, and so the runner will spend most of her time transitioning be-
tween the low states, leading to a total cost of Θ(n/m) so long as m is sufficiently large
that she never hits the absorbing state. Taking m = Ω(log n) suffices, and this leads to
a bound of Θ(n/ log(n)). In Section 5.1, we show how to improve this example to get a
linear bound for a broad class of present-bias distributions.
3.3. Skiers Renting or Buying Skies
Our third scenario in the introduction concerned a skier debating whether to rent or
buy skies. The skier buys a season pass on day 1 and commits to skiing every weekend
for the next n weeks. We construct a task graph G = (∪n+1i=1 Vi, E) with V1 = {s} and
Vn+1 = {t}. On each day i ∈ 2, . . . , n, there are two possible states, rent and own, cor-
responding to whether the skier uses rental equipment or his own equipment. Tran-
sitioning from a rent state (or s) to an own state on the following weekend costs 1,
the cost of buying skies. Transitioning from a rent state (or s) to another rent state
(or t) costs δ, the cost of renting skies. Once the skier is in the own state, all future
transitions are free. See Figure 1(c) for a representation of this task graph.
Note that this task graph has the monotone distance property. As we show in Sec-
tion 5.2, if the present-bias is “close enough” to 1 sufficiently often, such graphs have
6At fitness level m, running ceases to become a chore. At fitness level 0, lack of exercise causes remorse
and/or disutility from a low fitness level.
a constant procrastination ratio. Indeed, for δ < 2/3, we can bound the procrastina-
tion ratio by noting that the skier will choose to buy when bi = 1 (except possibly
towards the very end of the season) and rents otherwise. The cost is then at most∑n
i=1(
2
3 )
i(δ · i+1), which is a constant. Note that if the present-bias was bounded away
from 1, e.g., a point mass at 3, then the skier would rent for the entire season and pay
a linear cost.
4. WORST-CASE PROCRASTINATION
For a fixed present-bias distribution, we would like to characterize the worst-case pro-
crastination ratio over all task graphs with n days. To this end, we first derive the form
of a task graph that achieves the worst-case procrastination ratio for an arbitrary fixed
present-bias distribution. We then develop a natural parameterization of distributions
and bound this worst-case ratio as a function of the distribution parameters.
4.1. Worst-Case Task Graphs
Given present-bias distribution F , we will show that there is a worst-case task graph
with a simple form reminiscent of that from the student/homework example. On each
day there are only two possible states: the uncompleted state and the completed state.
Moving between uncompleted states or completed states has zero cost while moving
from an uncompleted state to a completed one has a cost which is a function of the
distribution.
The proof uses the following theorem from optimal pricing theory: A buyer has a
value for an item, drawn from a distribution, and faces a menu of options, each con-
sisting of a probability of allocation and a price.7 The buyer, acting to maximize his
expected utility (defined as value times allocation probability minus price), induces an
expected allocation and price of the menu. The theorem states that for any linear func-
tion of expected allocation and price, there is a simple single posted price menu that
optimizes that function.
THEOREM 4.1 ( [MYERSON 1981]). Let M ⊆ [0, 1]×R be such that (0, 0) ∈ M . For
any such M and v ∈ R+, write (xM (v), pM (v)) = argmax(x,p)∈M [vx − p]. Then for all
distributions F with support contained in R+, and for all α, β ∈ R, there exists a p∗ and
corresponding M∗ = {(0, 0), (1, p∗)} such that
αEv∼F [xM (v)] + βEv∼F [pM (v)] ≤ αEv∼F [xM∗(v)] + βEv∼F [pM∗(v)].
We will construct the worst-case task graph recursively. From a node vi, the subprob-
lem requires us to construct neighbors vi+1, edge weights w(vivi+1), and the weights
of the shortest paths d(vi+1tn+1) from these neighbors to the end state, all subject to
the constraint that the weight of the shortest path d(vi, tn+1) from vi to the end state
is preserved. We solve this subproblem by relating the ratio w(vivi+1)/d(vi, tn+1) to
the allocation probability and d(vi+1, tn+1)/d(vi, tn+1) to the price of a menu in pricing
theory.
THEOREM 4.2. Given a present-bias distribution F , there is a task graph over n
days, GnF = (∪n+1i=1 Vi, E), achieving maximum procrastination ratio with the following
form. Let V1 = {s1}, Vn+1 = {tn+1}, and d(s1, tn+1) = 1. Then
— for i ∈ 2, . . . , n, Vi = {si, ti},
— for i ∈ 1, . . . , n− 1, w(sisi+1) = 0,
— for i ∈ 2, . . . , n, w(titi+1) = 0,
— and for i ∈ 1, . . . , n, w(siti+1) = d(si, tn+1) ≤ d(si+1, tn+1),
7The menu must contain the option of not buying for a cost of zero, i.e., the buyer is allowed to walk away.
where d(si, tn+1) is chosen as a function of F .
PROOF. First note the assumption d(s1, tn+1) = 1 is without loss of generality as
we can always normalize all weights by the initial shortest path without changing the
procrastination ratio. We prove the theorem by constructing a worst-case task graph
recursively. In the i’th iteration, for i = 1 . . . n− 1, we will construct:
— the nodes of set Vi+1,
— the weights of edges from Vi to Vi+1,
— and the shortest continuation path weights d(vi+1, tn+1) for vi+1 ∈ Vi+1,
to maximize the expected procrastination ratio of the chosen path subject to con-
straints on the shortest paths d(vi, tn+1) for vi ∈ Vi.
We first describe the behavior of the agent at node vi for a fixed set of transi-
tion options Vi+1 consisting of weighted edges w(vivi+1) and continuation distances
d(vi+1, tn+1) for vi+1 ∈ Vi+1. An agent with present-bias parameter bi selects transition
v∗i+1 minimizing biw(vivi+1) + d(vi+1, tn+1). This minimization problem is equivalent
to the following maximization problem, as can be seen by first changing the sign of
the objective, then adding the constant bi · d(vi, tn+1), and then scaling by the constant
1/d(vi, tn+1):
max
vi+1∈Vi+1
(
bi
(
1− w(vivi+1)
d(vi, tn+1)
)
− d(vi+1, tn+1)
d(vi, tn+1)
)
.
The above problem is the optimization problem faced by a buyer in a pricing menu
where: the value of the buyer is bi, and the allocation and price of menu item vi+1
are x(vi+1) = 1 − w(vivi+1)d(vi,tn+1) and p(vi+1) =
d(vi+1,tn+1)
d(vi,tn+1)
, respectively. We argue this menu
satisfies the conditions of Theorem 4.1. As d(vi, tn+1) is the weight of the shortest vi −
tn+1 path, there must be an option vi+1 with w(vivi+1) ≤ d(vi, tn+1). Furthermore,
any option v′i+1 with w(viv′i+1) > d(vi, tn+1) will never be preferred to vi+1 and so we
can eliminate such nodes from the graph. Therefore, the allocations x(vi+1) are in [0, 1].
Furthermore, we can assume without loss of generality that there is a transition ti+1 ∈
Vi+1 with w(viti+1) = d(vi, tn+1) and d(ti+1, tn+1) = 0 as we are required to include a
transition option with w(vivi+1)+d(vi+1, tn+1) = d(vi, tn+1) and any such option weakly
dominates ti+1 for any bias factor. This proves that the menu contains an option ti+1
with x(ti+1) = 0 and p(ti+1) = 0.
To apply Theorem 4.1, we must argue that the objective of maximizing the procras-
tination ratio is linear in the expected allocation and pricing of any menu Vi+1 defined
above. Let OPT(i, d) denote the expected cost of the agent in the worst-case task graph
with n− i days and shortest path weight d. We can write OPT(i, d(vi, tn+1)), the worst-
case expected cost conditioned on being at vi, recursively as:
max
Vi+1
[
Ebi∼F
[
w(viv
∗
i+1)
]
+Ebi∼F
[
OPT(i+ 1, d(v∗i+1, tn+1))
] ]
,
where v∗i+1 is the choice of the agent with bias bi facing options Vi+1, and the base of
the recursion OPT(n, d) = d. Using the linearity of OPT(i, d) in its second argument
and the menu pricing notation introduced in the preceding paragraph, we see the op-
timization problem is equivalent to:
max
Vi+1
(
1− Ebi∼F [x(v∗i+1)] + Ebi∼F [p(v∗i+1)]OPT(i+ 1, 1)
)
· d(vi, tn+1). (1)
Applying Theorem 4.1, we conclude that there is an optimal menu Vi+1 = {si+1, ti+1}
where x(si+1) = 1, p(si+1) = p∗ ≥ 1 (as the value bi ≥ 1), x(ti+1) = 0, and p(ti+1) = 0.
Given a partially constructed task graph with Vi = {si, ti}, we can therefore optimally
extend it by defining Vi+1 = {si+1, ti+1}. The above discussion shows that the transi-
tions from si to Vi+1 should have edge weights w(sisi+1) = 0 and w(siti+1) = d(si, tn+1)
and continuation shortest path weights d(si+1, tn+1) ≥ d(si, tn+1) and d(ti+1, tn+1) = 0.
To satisfy the constraint that d(ti, tn+1) = 0 we also add an edge from ti to ti+1 of
weight zero. This completes the i’th iteration. To complete the construction, add edges
sntn+1 and tntn+1 with weights d(sn, tn+1) and 0, respectively.
4.2. Bounding the Procrastination Ratio for a Bias Distribution
In Section 4.1 we characterized the task graph that maximizes the procrastination
ratio for any given present-bias distribution. In this section we leverage this charac-
terization to explore how properties of the present-bias distribution impacts the worst-
case procrastination ratio. In particular, we are interested in determining features of
the bias distribution that imply sub-exponential, or even constant, bounds on the pro-
crastination ratio.
We first note that worst-case procrastination ratio can only be greater for distribu-
tions that generate higher present-bias parameters. Recall that distribution F¯ stochas-
tically dominates distribution F if, for all x, Prb∼F¯ [b > x] ≥ Prb∼F [b > x]. That is,F¯(x) ≤ F(x) for all x.
LEMMA 4.3. Given two distributions F and F¯ such that F¯ stochastically dominates
F , the worst-case procrastination ratio for F¯ is at least as large as the worst-case pro-
crastination ratio for F .
PROOF. Fix n and let GnF be a worst-case task graph for F of the form specified in
Theorem 4.2. We use costi to denote the expected cost paid by an agent with bi ∼ F
on days i, . . . , n in the graph GnF , conditional on being at node si on day i. Similarly,
we use costi to denote the expected cost paid by an agent with bi ∼ F¯ on days i, . . . , n
in the graph GnF , conditional on being at node si on day i. In the following we show
using backward induction on i that costi ≥ costi, implying that cost0, a lower bound on
the worst-case procrastination ratio for F¯ , is at least as large as cost0, the worst-case
procrastination ratio for F .
When i = n we have costn = costn = d(sn, tn+1). For i < n note that by definition
of GnF , an agent with threshold bias b0 = d(si+1, tn+1)/d(si, tn+1) is indifferent between
transitioning to si+1 at a cost of zero, and transitioning to ti+1 at a cost of d(si, tn+1)
with zero future costs. Thus{
costi = (1−F(b0)) · costi+1 + F(b0) · d(si, tn+1)
costi = (1− F¯(b0)) · costi+1 + F¯(b0) · d(si, tn+1). (2)
By induction, costi+1 ≥ costi+1, and so
costi − costi ≥
(F(b0)− F¯(b0)) · (costi+1 − d(si, tn+1)) .
By stochastic dominance, F(b0) ≥ F¯(b0), and by the construction of GnF , costi+1 ≥
d(si+1, tn+1) ≥ d(si, tn+1). As a result costi − costi ≥ 0, which completes the induc-
tion.
Lemma 4.3 motivates us to categorize distributions into classes, where all distri-
butions in a certain class stochastically dominate a family of distributions. Such a
categorization, along with Lemma 4.3, will allow us to derive bounds on the procrasti-
nation ratio of any given distribution. Our bound will be with respect to the following
parametrization of present-bias distributions, which is essentially the largest value
z such that the distribution stochastically dominates the equal-revenue distribution
with revenue z.8
Definition 4.4. Given a distribution F with support contained in [1,∞), write
z(F) ≡ max (1−F(b))b. Given z ∈ (0,∞), we will write F(z) for the family of distri-
butions F with z(F) = z.
Note that any distribution F with bounded support belongs to some family F(z),
potentially with z =∞. For F ∈ F(∞), i.e., F has infinite support and F /∈ F(z) for any
z > 0, then there are task graphs for F with procrastination ratio growing faster than
any exponential function in n. We will largely focus on distributions for which z(F) is
finite.
To build some intuition for the classes F(z), we give below a few examples.
(1) The uniform distribution over the interval [1, 3] belongs to the family F(1.125), with
(1−F(1.5)) · 1.5 = 1.125.
(2) The uniform distribution over the interval [1, 2] belongs to the family F(1).
(3) Suppose F is the upper half of a normal distribution with mean 1. That is, b =
max(ξ, 1) where ξ ∼ N(1, 1) is a normal random variable with mean and normal
deviation equal to 1. In this case, we can maximize b(1− F(b)) numerically to find
that F(b) ∈ F(z) for z ≈ 0.507.
(4) Suppose F(x) = 1 − 1
2
√
x
for x ∈ [1, 100), and F(100) = 1. This is a heavy-tailed
distribution, which has an atom at b = 1 with probability 12 . This distribution
belongs to F(5).
We are now ready to bound the worst-case procrastination ratio for any given dis-
tribution F , as a function of z(F). The following two theorems tell us whether a given
distribution has an exponential, linear, or constant procrastination ratio, in the worst
case over task graphs. Theorem 4.5 provides an upper bound on the procrastination
ratio, which is tight for the family F(z). Theorem 4.6 provides a lower bound for any
given distribution.
THEOREM 4.5. Let F ∈ F(z) for some z > 0. Then the procrastination ratio of any
task graph for F is at most ∑k−1i=0 zi and this bound is tight.
PROOF. To prove an upper bound on the procrastination ratio we analyze the follow-
ing distribution F with bounded support on [1, C], where C is some sufficiently large
constant:
F :
{
Pr[b = 1] = 1− z, if z < 1
Pr[b ≤ x] = 1− z/x, x ∈ [max(1, z), C]
Pr[b = C] = z/C
We note that F stochastically dominates every distribution in F(z) with support
bounded by C.
Recall from Theorem 4.2 the form of the worst-case task graph for distribution F .
We briefly describe the form of the graph here. Given a current state vi, the agent
is offered two options: an edge with weight d(vi, t) (and no further costs thereafter),
and an edge with weight 0 that transitions to a vertex vi+1 with increased distance
to t. We claim that, in fact, d(vi+1, t) = C · d(vi, t) in the worst-case graph. To see
why, note that according to (1) the worst-case task graph maximizes a linear function
of Ebi∼F [x(v∗i+1)] and Ebi∼F [p(v∗i+1)]. The former term does not depend on the set of
offered price p, because Ebi∼F [p(v∗i+1)] corresponds in (1) to the expected revenue of a
8The equal-revenue distribution with revenue z satisfies F (x) = 1− z
x
for all x ≥ z.
single item auction for the equal revenue distribution F . Therefore, Ebi∼F [p(v∗i+1)] = z
for any menu of options, and hence the optimization problem reduces to maximizing
the term 1 − Ebi∼F [x(v∗i+1)]. It is maximized when the agent’s probability of paying a
positive cost at step i is maximized. This is maximized when agent can either increase
the distance to t to d(vi+1, t) = C · d(vi, t), or pay the total amount d(vi, t) right away.
Thus we obtain the worst-case task graph.
Now we calculate the procrastination ratio of this task graph. At step i, from a given
vertex v ∈ {vi, ui}, the expected distance to t is E[d(v, t)] = zi−1. The probability that
agent takes a non-zero edge is 1 − 1/C. Thus at the steps i = 1, . . . , n − 1 the agents
pays a cost, in expectation, of F(C) ·E[d(v, t)] = (1− 1/C) · zi−1 and E[d(v, t)] = zn−1 at
the last step. As a result, the total expected cost paid by the agent is
n−1∑
i=1
(1− 1/C) · zi−1 + zn−1
As C tends to infinity this quantity converges to
∑n
i=1 z
i−1 = 1−z
n
1−z . This is an upper
bound on the procrastination ratio for F ∈ F(z) by Lemma 4.3. Furthermore, this
bound is tight for the class F(z), since we have exhibited a distribution and a task
graph that achieve this bound in the limit as C →∞.
THEOREM 4.6. For arbitrary F , if (1−F(b0)) b0 = z for some point b0 > 1, then
there is a task graph with procrastination ratio
∑n−1
i=1 (1− 1/b0) · zi−1 + zn−1.
PROOF. Indeed, we may assume that F has finite support {1, b0}, since every
other distribution stochastically dominates this one and by revenue monotonicity
(Lemma 4.3) the adversary may only get higher procrastination ratio. The task graph
from the proof of Theorem 4.5 gives us the required bound.
With these results in hand, we can bound the worst-case competitive ratios for the
examples described above:
(1) The uniform distribution over the interval [1, 3] is in F(1.125), so Theorem 4.5 im-
plies that the worst-case procrastination ratio of any task graph for this distribu-
tion is not more than O(1.125n). Moreover, Theorem 4.6 applied at point b0 = 1.5
implies that there are task graphs with procrastination ratio of Ω(1.125n).
(2) The uniform distribution over the interval [1, 2] is in F(1), and therefore has at
most a linear procrastination ratio for any task graph (Theorem 4.5). On the other
hand, one can obtain sublinear bound of Ω(
√
n) in Theorem 4.6 by taking b0 = 1 + ε
and z = 1− ε2 for any ε > 0.
(3) For the upper half of a normal distribution with mean 1, since the distribution lies
in F(z) with z ≈ 0.507, Theorem 4.5 implies that the procrastination ratio is at
most 2.03.
(4) For the distribution given by F(x) = 1− 1
2
√
x
for x ∈ [1, 100), and F(100) = 1, since
the distribution belongs to F(5) we have that the procrastination ratio is bounded
by O(5n), and invoking Theorem 4.6 with b0 = 100 shows that it can be as large as
Ω(5n).
5. SPECIAL TASK GRAPHS
In this section we consider restrictions on the structure of a task graph. We first study
the impact of bounding the length of the shortest path to the target node, from any ver-
tex in the network. We then consider a stronger monotonicity property, which roughly
states that following an edge in the graph can never increase the length of the shortest
path to the target. We will show that the former property implies a linear procrastina-
tion ratio, and this is tight, whereas the latter property implies a constant procrasti-
nation ratio for appropriate present-bias distributions.
5.1. Bounded Distance
Here we consider the class of task graphs such that distance from any given state to t
is bounded by the initial distance d(s, t). As it turns out, any such graph has at most a
linear procrastination ratio, for any distribution F .
CLAIM 5.1. The procrastination ratio of any protocol with bounded distance does
not exceed n.
PROOF. Suppose the chosen path is v1, v2, . . . , vn, t. By assumption, d(vi, t) ≤ d(s, t)
for all i. Since the agent chooses the edge vivi+1 to minimize bi · w(vivi+1) + d(i + 1, t)
where bi ≥ 1, and since the first edge of the path realizing distance d(vi, t) is itself
an option, it must be that w(vivi+1) ≤ d(vi, t) ≤ d(s, t) for each i. The total cost of the
chosen path is therefore at most n · d(s, t).
The bound in Claim 5.1 holds for arbitrary procrastination ratios. One might hope
that if the present-bias distribution F is sufficiently well-behaved, the procrastination
ratio would improve. However, as we now show, this bound on the procrastination ratio
is asymptotically tight for any F ∈ F(z), for any z > 1. In other words, one cannot hope
to avoid a linear lower bound unless F ∈ F(z) for some z ≤ 1, which we view as a
particularly strict condition.
The rough idea for the construction is to simulate a random walk. Whenever the
present-bias parameter is low the agent will incur a cost and reduce the length of
the shortest path to the goal, but whenever the present-bias parameter is high the
length of the shortest path will increase. Over the course of n steps, the agent will
have repeatedly made and lost progress sufficiently often to have accrued a total cost
that is linear in n, with high probability.
THEOREM 5.1. If F ∈ F(z) for some z > 1, then there is a task graph with bounded
shortest path that has procrastination ratio Ω(n).
PROOF. Let δ ∈ (0, 1) and integers α, β ≥ 1 be constants that depend on F , to be
determined later. We construct a task graph as follows. Each layer Vi contains nβ
vertices; say Vi = {vi,1, . . . , vi,nβ}. Each vertex vi,j has out-degree at most 2. For i < n,
starting from vertex vi,j ,
— if α ≤ j ≤ (n− 1)β, then the agent may go either to vi+1,j−α at no cost, or to vi+1,j+β
at a cost of δj − δj+β ;
— if j < α, then the agent must transition to vi+1,α at a cost of δj − δα.
— Otherwise, if j > (n− 1)β, the agent must transition to vi+1,j at no cost.
For i = n, each vertex vi,j has only a single outgoing edge (vi,j , t), which has cost δj .
We claim that, for each vertex vi,j , we have d(vi,j , t) = δj . This is achieved by
the path in which the agent always chooses the option with positive cost, when-
ever multiple options are available. That is, the agent repeatedly chooses to take
the route that increases the second coordinate of its vertex, if possible. If this path
is vi,j , vi2,j2 , . . . , vi`,j` , t, then the total cost is
(δj − δj2) + (δj2 − δj3) + . . .+ (δj`−1 − δj`) + δj` = δj ,
via a telescoping sum. The agent starts at v1,0, and d(v1,0, t) = 1. We note that the task
graph satisfies the bounded distance condition.
vi,kβ
vi,j
vi,1
vi,kβ
vi,j+β
vi+1,j−α
vi+1,α
0
δi(1− δβ)
0
1− δα
Fig. 2. Task completion graph for the protocol
Let b∗ be such that (1 − F(b∗))b∗ = z > 1; we know such a b∗ exists by assumption.
We will then choose α and β so that
1
b∗
<
β
α+ β
< 1−F(b∗).
Note that the agent will select the 0-cost option, if multiple options are available, when
δj−α < bi(δj − δj+β) + δj+β .
We claim that this will occur for bi ≥ b∗, if δ is sufficiently close to 1. To see this,
define H(δ) def= b∗ · δα − δα+β · (b∗ − 1). Note that H(1) = 1. Furthermore, H ′(1) =
b∗ · α − (α + β) · (b∗ − 1) = α + β − β · b∗ is negative if 1b∗ < βα+β . The claim follows,
as H(δ) = H(1) − H ′(1)(1 − δ) + o (1− δ) for δ sufficiently close to 1. Choose δ to be
sufficiently close to 1 for the claim to hold.
Given i < n and j such that α ≤ j ≤ (n − 1)β, let γ be the expectation, over the
present-bias distribution, of the change in index of the current vertex when an agent
makes a single move starting at vertex vi,j . Then γ is at most βF(b∗) − α(1 − F(b∗)),
which is negative by our choice of α and β.
Note that since the agent started at v1,0 it is impossible to reach a state vi,j where
j ≥ (n−1)β. We now count the sum of all changes in vertex index, over the course of the
agent’s selected path, enumerated separately for two cases: (i) when α ≤ j ≤ (n− 1)β,
and when (ii) j < α.
Let random variables s1 and s2 denote the sum of changes in vertex index for these
two cases. We observe that the total sum must be non-negative, and hence
E[s1] + E[s2] ≥ 0. (3)
Also, by our construction, if j < α then the subsequent step will have j ≥ α, and hence
the second case applies in at least half of the rounds. Therefore,
E[s1] ≤ γ · n/2 (4)
where recall that γ < 0. Equations (3) and (4) imply that
E[s2] ≥ −γ · n/2. (5)
Note that for each index-increasing step, the agent is reducing the shortest path and
incurring an immediate cost equal to that reduction. The minimum cost reduction
between two consecutive states is δα−1 − δα, in the case when j < α. We can therefore
conclude that
n∑
i=1
E[wi] ≥ −γ · n/2 · (δa−1 − δα) = Ω(n) (6)
as required.
5.2. Monotone distance
We next consider the class of task graphs with the monotone distance property. Recall
that for such task graphs, the distance from any given state to t is monotonically non-
increasing along every edge in the graph.
We first note that if F is the present-bias distribution, and there exists some δ > 0
such that F(1 + δ) = 0 (that is, 1 + δ is a lower bound on the present bias parameter),
then there exist task graphs with the monotone distance property with procrastination
ratio Ω(δn). Indeed, consider the ski-renting example from Section 3: if F places all of
its mass on values greater than 11−δ , the agent would choose to pay δ at each step. This
leads to a total cost of nδ, whereas a cost of 1 was possible.
This example motivates us to consider distributions F that satisfy a mild condition,
which essentially captures the requirement that there be sufficient mass in neighbor-
hoods around b = 1. Specifically, we will require that there exist some constants β, δ > 0
such that F(x) ≥ β · (x− 1) for all x ∈ [1, 1 + δ].9 We show that under this condition, the
procrastination ratio is bounded by a constant.
THEOREM 5.2. For any β, δ > 0, if F(x) ≥ β · (x − 1) for all x ∈ [1, 1 + δ], then any
task graph with monotone distances has procrastination ratio at most max(1 + 1β ,
1
βδ ).
PROOF. As in Theorem 4.2, we will characterize the task graphs with maximum
procrastination ratio by way of an analogy with single-parameter auctions. Following
the notation in the proof of Theorem 4.2, we have that the problem of maximizing the
procrastination ratio can be expressed recursively (up to a constant d(vi, tn+1)) as
max
Vi+1
(
1− Ebi∼F [x(v∗i+1)] + Ebi∼F [p(v∗i+1)]OPT(i+ 1, 1)
)
.
The monotone distances property imposes the constraint that d(vi+1, t) ≤ d(vi, t) for
all vi+1 ∈ Vi+1. Since p(vi+1) = d(vi+1,t)d(vi,t) , this translates to a constraint that p(v∗i+1) ∈
[0, 1]. Unlike the proof of Theorem 4.2, we cannot employ Theorem 4.1, since the price
suggested by Theorem 4.1 may be greater than 1. Instead, we will use the following
variation.
CLAIM 5.2. Let M ⊆ [0, 1] × [0, 1] be a menu of options (x, p) such that (0, 0) ∈ M .
For any such M and v ∈ R≥1, write (xM (v), pM (v)) = argmax(x,p)∈M [vx − p]. Then for
all distributions F with support on [1,∞), and for all α ∈ R, β ∈ R≥0, there exists an
x∗ ∈ [0, 1] and corresponding M∗ = {(0, 0), (x∗, 1)} such that
αEv∼F [xM (v)] + βEv∼F [pM (v)] ≤ αEv∼F [xM∗(v)] + βEv∼F [pM∗(v)].
9Sufficient conditions for our requirement including having a positive mass at b = 1, or having a constant
lower bound on the density function in any neighborhood around b = 1.
PROOF. For simplicity we will prove the claim under the assumption that menu M
is finite. We note that the result directly extends to general M . Also, in the context in
which we apply the claim (namely, when menu M corresponds to a task graph), M is
finite.
Write M = {(x1, p1), . . . , (xk, pk)}. We will say that the item (xi, pi) is chosen by value
v if (xM (v), pM (v)) = (xi, pi). We will partition the set of possible values v (i.e., R≥1)
according to their chosen lottery. Note that, for each i, the set of values that choose
(xi, pi) forms an interval, say [vi−1, vi). Without loss of generality, we can assume every
element of M is chosen by some value. In this case, we can choose to index lotteries so
that 1 = v0 < v1 < · · · < vk = ∞. In this case, we must have 0 = x0 ≤ x1 < x2 < · · · <
xk ≤ 1 and p1 < p2 < · · · < pk ≤ 1. We note that the latter can be derived from well-
known payment identities of incentive compatible auctions [Myerson 1981]. Moreover,
the fact that vi−1 is the threshold type between choosing (xi−1, pi−1) and (xi, pi), and is
therefore indifferent between these auctions, implies that
vj−1 · (xj − xj−1) = pj − pj−1 if j ∈ {2, . . . , k}
v0 · x1 − p1 > 0 if j = 1. (7)
We now consider a collection of two-element menus M1, . . . ,Mk, where Mj =
{(0, 0), ( 1vj−1 , 1)}. We will construct a distribution over these menus, and consider of-
fering one of them at random: say menu Mj is chosen with probability mj . We want
to choose {m1, . . . ,mk} such that for every value v ∈ [vj−1, vj ], the expected allocation
chosen by v under this distribution of menus is exactly xj (the allocation under M ),
and the expected payment is at least pj . Note then that this random menu, call it Mr,
can only increase our objective of interest:
αEv∼F [xM (v)] + βEv∼F [pM (v)] ≤ αEv∼F [xMr (v)] + βEv∼F [pMr (v)].
Since Mr is a convex combination of menus Mj , there must exist at least one Mj for
which the objective is at least as high as for Mr. This Mj satisfies the requirements of
the claim.
It remains to find appropriate probabilities m1, . . . ,mk. We will choose mj = vj−1 ·
(xj − xj−1), where j ∈ {1, . . . , k} and x0 = 0.
We observe that each type v ∈ (vi−1, vi) chooses the option ( 1vj−1 , 1) in Mj for every
j ∈ {1, . . . , i} and option (0, 0) for the remaining j. Therefore, the allocation probability
and expected payment of type v is
x(v) =
i∑
j=1
1
vj−1
·mj =
i∑
j=1
xj − xj−1 = xi
p(v) =
i∑
j=1
mj =
i∑
j=1
vj−1 · (xj − xj−1) = v0 · x1 +
i∑
j=2
(pj − pj−1) = pi − p1 + x1 ≥ pi,
where the last inequality and previous two equalities follow from (7) and telescopic
summation. Since p(vk) ≤ 1 we also get that
∑k
j=1mj ≤ 1. If
∑k
j=1mj is strictly less
than 1, we can extend to a probability distribution by adding a dummy lottery M0 =
{(0, 0)} that is offered with probability 1−∑kj=1mj .
Claim 5.2 implies that there is an optimal menu Vi+1 = {vi+1, ui+1} where x(vi+1) ≤
1, p(vi+1) ≤ 1, x(ui+1) = 0, and p(ui+1) = 0. Given a partially constructed task graph
with Vi = {vi, ui}, we can therefore optimally extend it by defining Vi+1 = {vi+1, ui+1}.
Applying the same reasoning as in the proof of Theorem 4.2, we can conclude that
the transitions from vi to Vi+1, and the continuation shortest path weights, will be as
follows:
(1) w(viui+1) = d(vi, t) and d(ui+1, t) = 0, and
(2) w(vivi+1) ≤ d(vi, t) and d(vi+1, t) ≤ d(vi, t).
Note that the task graph is now fully specified, except for the values of w(vivi+1)
and d(vi+1, t) for each i ≤ n. (Recall that we must have vn+1 = un+1 = t.) For any
such graph and distribution F , we can write qi for the probability that the agent would
choose ui+1 instead of vi+1, from vi. That is,
qi = Prbi∼F
[
bi · w(vivi+1)
d(vi, t)
+
d(vi+1, t)
d(vi, t)
≥ bi · 1
]
.
We can write the following expression for the optimum at each state vi scaled by d(vi, t),
again following the notation from the proof of Theorem 4.2:
OPT(i, 1) = qi · 1 + (1− qi)
(
w(vivi+1)
d(vi, t)
+
d(vi+1, t)
d(vi, t)
·OPT(i+ 1, 1)
)
. (8)
To complete the proof of Theorem 5.2, it suffices to show that OPT(i, 1) ≤ max(1+ 1β , 1βδ )
for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n. We will show this by backward induction on i. The base case i = n
follows immediately from the fact that OPT (n, 1) = 1 ≤ max(1 + 1β , 1βδ ), since the agent
has only one option: moving to vertex t.
Consider i < n. Let ∆ def= max(1 + 1β ,
1
βδ ). By (8), it is sufficient to show that ∆ ≥
qi + (1− qi)(w(vivi+1)d(vi,t) +
d(vi+1,t)
d(vi,t)
·∆), or equivalently that
∆qi + ∆(1− qi)
(
1− d(vi+1, t)
d(vi, t)
)
≥ qi + (1− qi)w(vivi+1)
d(vi, t)
. (9)
We consider two cases based on the value of qi.
Case 1: qi ≥ βδ. Then ∆ · qi ≥ qiβδ ≥ 1, and hence the left hand side of (9) is at least 1.
On the other hand, since w(vivi+1)d(vi,t) ≤ 1, the right hand side of (9) is at most 1.
Case 2: qi < βδ. We observe that qi = F
(
d(vi+1,t)
d(vi,t)−w(vivi+1)
)
and by the condi-
tion of the theorem that F (x) ≥ β(x − 1) for x ∈ [1, 1 + δ] we therefore have
qi ≥ β ·
(
d(vi+1,t)
d(vi,t)−w(vivi+1) − 1
)
. We therefore have
∆qi + ∆(1− qi)
(
1− d(vi+1, t)
d(vi, t)
)
≥ qi + 1
β
qi + (1− qi)
(
1− d(vi+1, t)
d(vi, t)
)
≥ qi + (1− qi)
(
1
β
qi + 1− d(vi+1, t)
d(vi, t)
)
≥ qi + (1− qi)
(
d(vi+1, t)
d(vi, t)− w(vivi+1) − 1 + 1−
d(vi+1, t)
d(vi, t)
)
= qi + (1− qi) d(vi+1, t)
d(vi, t)− w(vivi+1)
w(vivi+1)
d(vi, t)
≥ qi + (1− qi)w(vivi+1)
d(vi, t)
,
where the first inequality follows from ∆ ≥ 1 + 1β , the second inequality we simply
reduced the second term by (1− qi); in the third inequality we applied our lower bound
on qi. The final inequality follows because d(vi+1, t)+w(vivi+1) ≥ d(vi, t), which implies
that d(vi+1,t)d(vi,t)−w(vivi+1) ≥ 1. We have therefore established (9), as desired.
6. CONCLUSIONS AND OPEN PROBLEMS
We have examined how variability in an individual’s decision making process can affect
behavior in time-inconsistent planning scenarios. We adopted the graphical framework
of Kleinberg and Oren [Kleinberg and Oren 2014] and characterized worst-case task
graphs for the agent. We showed that depending on the distribution of the present-
bias parameter, the worst-case procrastination ratio is either bounded by constant, is
at most linear, or grows at least exponentially with the number of agent’s steps n. We
also examined two natural families of tasks: (i) those in which the cost of reaching
the goal is never more than at the outset, and (ii) those in which an agent can never
lose progress toward the goal. We showed that in the first scenario the worst-case
procrastination ratio is at most O(n), and this is tight, and for the second scenario
the procrastination ratio is O(1) under some mild assumptions on the present-bias
distribution.
Our work leaves open many avenues for future study. The following are a few con-
crete questions:
(1) We always assume that b ≥ 1. What could be the worst-case procrastination ratio
if bi can be smaller than 1? For example, an agent might receive a reminder about
the task and becomes anxious to complete it as soon as possible.
(2) We examine worst-case procrastination ratio for a fixed distribution of b ∼ F . Is
there a bound on procrastination ratio for a given pair of the task graph and dis-
tribution F? In other words, are certain distributions better suited to certain tasks
than others? What is an important intrinsic parameter of a weighted graph that
can lead to large procrastination?
(3) We examined the case of a simple, naı¨ve agent who never anticipates their time-
inconsistency. What can one say about agents who can reason about their future
propensity to procrastinate?
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